First of all, a thank you to
Jett for pointing me to the
opinion written by Judge Michael Luttig for the 4th District Court of Appeals. The court overturned an earlier decision made by the Federal District Court of South Carolina, which held that the United States executive branch lacked the authority to detain Padilla indefinitely without charge.
Jett goes on to point out--and I agree--that the language of the opinion itself seems sound. Of course, neither Jett nor I have any actual legal expertise. I am, nonetheless, completely willing to retained as your attorney, providing you offer fair compensation. But I think he's right to say that the issue here seems to hinge entirely on whether or not we consider ourselves to be "at war" with Al Qaeda and whether or not this "war" has the same legal status as other, more conventional wars.
Jett then pointed out that, in this case, Congress never actually declared "war" on Al Qaeda
per se, and that it's moreover a different matter to wage war on a loose organization of radicals than to wage war on a national entity.
This, of course, is precisely the issue, and plenty of editorials and blog entries have already been written about this. My basic position is that the detention of enemy combatants during a conventional war is necessary. As "enemies," they are not necessarily engaged in criminal activity. At the same time, they want to kill you. You can't prosecute them for merely being on the other side of the war, but you certainly can't release them while the fighting is still going on.
Padilla, as Jett points out,
can be charged with a crime: multiple counts of attempted murder, property destruction, aiding and abetting the enemy, terrorism, and probably racketeering and conspiracy. Furthermore, he is a U.S. citizen. The suspension of his right to due process, in this case, doesn't seem to offer any tangible strategic advantage in the "war" against Al Qaeda. The idea that he's going to have much to tell the authorities about Al Qaeda's plans at this point--after 3-1/2 years in detention--seems far fetched. Moreover, the conditions for declaring an end to this "war" (and thereby requiring that Padilla be charged or released) have never been laid out. Nothing new about any of this, I know.
The sticky point here, though, is that while Congress did not declare "war" against Al Qaeda, it did give the President the power to do so. The "Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution," passed shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and quoted in Luttig's opinion, says:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
This, from what I can tell, is the primary basis of the 4th Circuit court's opinion.
That said, I'm not convinced it's a good opinion. The court seems to see the Congressional resolution as a valid basis for declaring Padilla's detention to be legal, but I would argue that the court has the responsibility to limit the power of legislative resolutions to accord with the rights supposedly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Earlier I said that things aren't looking good for due process. Let me add, now, that things aren't looking good for the separation of powers. This decision, if upheld, essentially grants judicial powers to the executive branch of the federal government. By interpreting the Joint Resolution as allowing the President to "determine" that U.S. citizens can be subjected to "all necessary and appropriate force," this court essentially undermines its own ability and responsibility to
check the authority of the executive and legislative branches.